Totalitarianism*, (Same-Sex) marriage and democratic politics in post-apartheid South Africa by Barnard, Jaco
TOTALITARIANISM,* (SAME-SEX) 
MARRIAGE AND DEMOCRATIC 
POLITICS IN POST-APARTHEID 
SOUTH AFRICA
Jaco baRnaRd**
ABSTRACT
This article interrogates what it considers to be several totalitarian moments in the process 
that led to the legislation that authorised same-sex marriage in South Africa. The interroga-
tion proceeds from three platforms which also form the basis of any believable theory of 
democratic politics, namely church/state separation, plurality and common (shared) citizen-
ship. My argument is that Parliament — by introducing (and defending) the first draft of 
the Civil Union Bill (which deliberately failed to introduce a marriage regime for same-sex 
life partnerships) in response to the Fourie judgment — failed properly to consider all three 
of these fundamental aspects of democracy. This failure was complemented by more overt 
totalitarian moves on the part of several fundamentalist religious groups in South Africa that 
(ironically so) vehemently opposed the first draft of the Bill even though it did not provide 
for same-sex marriage. I conclude that democratic activism coupled with the strength of and 
commitment to the South African Constitution and to the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court ensured the successful evasion of these totalitarian moments while emphasising that 
the struggle against totalitarianism in South Africa is far from over.
[T]he criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism of Earth, the criticism of religion into 
the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics…1
[E]ven the greatest forces of intimate life — the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the 
mind, the delights of the senses — lead an uncertain, shadowy existence unless and until 
they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit 
them for public appearance.2 
I  PReface: hIstoRy by Way of snaPshots
Fragmented, unorganised, vulnerable and leaderless. These are the words with 
which early Christianity came to be described.3 But this dis-organisation, we 
recall, existed within a highly organised and sophisticated state framework 
* Slavoj Žižek’s book Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (2001) provokes a dialogue with this article 
that cannot be engaged with here, save for stating emphatically that this article makes it impossible 
to disagree enough with Žižek’s basic premise, namely that the contemporary understanding of 
totalitarianism serves to stultify the possibility of a radical project that would respond authentically 
to liberal-democratic hegemony.
** Senior Lecturer, Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town. This article is for Hannah 
van Marle and Lyra Liddle, whose arrival crucially came to remind of new beginnings and the 
miracle of natality. I am grateful to Shaun Fergus for invaluable research assistance.
1 K Marx ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction’ in K Marx 
Karl Marx Early Writings (trans R Livingstone & G Benton, 1992) 243, 244-24.
2 H Arendt The Human Condition (198, 1998) 0.
3 D Knowles ‘Church and State in Christian History’ (1967) 2(4) J of Contemporary History 3, 4.
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— the renowned Roman Empire4 — which at the time still swore allegiance 
to a host of polytheistic deities of which the pagan gods Janus and Minerva 
were the most important. Seeing that the Christians’ own highest authority 
decreed that the kingdom (state) of Christ was not of this world6 and that one 
must give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar,7 the Christians, under these cir-
cumstances, easily came to believe and accept that human authority derived 
from God — which led to a dispensation according to which the church had 
no political existence other than an uncritical obedience towards state policy 
and principle.8 In fact, Christianity starts off with nothing less than a declara-
tion of independence: defining itself as disinterested, indifferent and neutral 
with regard to politics.9
In 306, this pious dispensation changed radically when Constantine became 
the first Christian Roman emperor.10 With this event, the Christian church and 
political rule became inseparably involved — consubstantial.11 The emperor 
becomes the chosen man of God — the one who is not only to ensure politi-
cal peace but also spiritual peace in men by bringing them to the service of 
God.12 Because the church at the time had no unifying person or machinery, 
the emperor became the perfect fill for the void — both religious belief and 
state policy became embodied in the person of the head of state and with this 
a hopeless confusion took charge: The church becomes the state; the state 
becomes the church. Church-state. State-church.
At the time that Constantine came to power, rampant confusion reigned 
over the legal status of unions (consortia omni vitae) between slaves and 
free persons, which unions themselves — as a matter of frequency — were 
rampant.13 One of the most characteristic elements of Constantine’s rule was 
his re-criminalisation of mixed marriages between slaves and free persons 
according to which the offence became punishable by death.14 Commentators 
have shown that this legislation was passed ‘in an attempt to eradicate concu-
binage and to uphold a noble, ‘Christian’ ideal of marriage.’1
*
4 Ibid.
 Respectively, the Roman god of beginnings and the goddess of rememberance. See AD Lee 
‘Traditional Religions’ in N Lenski (ed) The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine 19, 
16. Also see H Arendt ‘What is Authority?’ in H Arendt Between Past and Future (1969) 91-141.
6 Holy Bible (King James Version) John xviii 36.
7 Ibid Matthew xxii 21.
8 Knowles (note 3 above)  points out that individual Christians might have come into conflict with 
the state, but the church of early Christianity did not have (or perhaps could not afford) confronta-
tion with the state.
9 W Hamacher ‘The Right to Have Rights (Four-and-a-Half Remarks)’ (2004) 103(2/3) South 
Atlantic Quarterly 343. Also see H Arendt On Revolution (1963, 1990) 280: ‘freedom from politics, 
… politically perhaps the most relevant part of our Christian heritage.’
10 IJ Davidson (ed) The Birth of the Church (2001) 343-346; Knowles (note 3 above) .
11 Knowles (note 3 above) .
12 Ibid.
13 J Evans-Grubbs ‘“Marriage More Shameful Than Adultery”: Slave-Mistress Relationships, “Mixed 
Marriages”, and Late Roman Law’ (1993) 47(2) Phoenix 12, 137-138.
14 Ibid 140-141. Also see M de la Paz & RA Zone Constantine the Great (2006) 11.
1 Evans-Grubbs (note 13 above) 149.
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In 162 Jan van Riebeeck (a Dutch Christian) arrives at the southern tip of 
Africa and the Cape Colony is founded with a prayer — followed by the quick 
realisation that the establishment of a refreshment station requires a whole lot 
of labour.16 Unfortunately for Van Riebeeck, the Dutch East Indian Company 
(VOC) forbade the enslavement of the Khoi as a free people.17 The solution to this 
was to import slaves from Angola and Dahomey.18 Shortly after his arrival, Van 
Riebeeck founded the South African Dutch Reformed Church19 which remained 
— right up to the abolition of slavery — uncritical of it, save for pronouncing that 
Christians could not be enslaved and that converted slaves had to be set free.20 As 
was the case in the Roman Empire, marriage between a slave and a free person 
was absolutely prohibited and attracted the gravest of legal sanctions.21 The first 
slave to be set free at the Cape, Catharina Anthonis, was set free in 166 because 
a free man, Jan Woutersz from Middelburg, wanted to marry her.22
*
On 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler (a Christian man heavily influenced by 
occultist Aryanism)23 became the chancellor of the third German reich.24 Two 
years later, on 1 September 193, the Law for the Protection of German 
Blood and Honour was passed.2 It absolutely prohibited the marriage of a Jew 
to a non-Jew. At the same time, the Reich Citizenship Law was passed which 
decreed that the Jews were no longer citizens of Germany.26 With this move, 
Nazi totalitarianism received the stamp of legal authority, the force of law, 
total domination. The rest, as they say, is history.
*
In 1948, Daniel Francois Malan (a Dutch Reformed minister) becomes 
the first prime minister of apartheid.27 Soon after this, the Dutch Reformed 
Church actively propagates the ‘purist’ conception of apartheid according to 
which total segregation between white and black South Africans is culturally 
essential for the survival of white ‘civilization’ in South Africa and politically 
necessary for the continuation of white rule.28 This became known as the ideol-
16 RCH Shell Children of Bondage (1994, 1997) 1-6.
17 K Tankard ‘Slavery at the Early Cape’ knowledge4africa.com available at <http://www.knowl-
edge4africa.co.za/worldhistory/slaves00.htm>.
18 D Glaser Politics and Society in South Africa (2001).
19 <http://www.ngkerk.org.za/inligting.asp?id=24&sinid=22>.
20 Tankard (note 17 above).
21 EL Matthews ‘South African Legislation Relating to Marriage or Sexual Intercourse Between 
Europeans and Natives or Coloured Persons’ (1920) 2(1) J of Comparative Legislation and Int Law 
117, 118; Evans-Grubbs (note 13 above) 127.
22 AM van Rensburg ‘“Let them Speak” Slave Stamouers of South Africa’ available at <http://www.
stamouers.com/Slave.htm>.
23 V Clark Hitler’s Persecution of Jews  The Influence of Christianity (2006) 2.
24 J Toland Adolf Hitler  The Definitive Biography (1976, 1992) 290.
2 Ibid 379.
26 J Noakes & G Pridham Documents on Nazism 1919-1945 (1974) 463-467.
27 R Ross ‘The fundamentalisation of Afrikaner Calvinism’ in H Diederiks & GC Quispel (eds) Onderscheid 
en Minderheid Sociaal-Historische Opstellen over Discriminatie en Vooroordeel (1987) 201
28 S Terreblanche A History of Inequality in South Africa (2002) 314.
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ogy of the ‘swart gevaar’.29 Shortly after Malan’s election and at the insistence 
of the Dutch Reformed Church,30 Parliament passed the Mixed Marriages Act 
 of 1949, according to which the law prohibited not only a marriage, but any 
form of co-habitation between white and black.
*
During September and October of 1996 a fundamentalist Sunni Muslim 
and ethnic Pashtun movement, the Taliban, takes control of a divided and 
devastated Afghanistan.31 While in control of Afghanistan, the Taliban 
accommodates the Al-Quaeda terrorist network believed to be responsible 
for the September 11, 2001 attacks on various targets in the United States, 
including, of course, the famous Twin Towers.32 The signature aspect of the 
Taliban’s reign in Afghanistan was its ‘war on women’.33 Marriage was the 
centre of this war, because it provides the locus for the control and subjugation 
of women under the Taliban’s fundamentalist interpretation of the Islamic law 
according to which forced marriages and child marriages are legal.34
*
On 24 February 2004, George W Bush — a staunch conservative Christian 
but also the leader of the most powerful political dispensation on Earth, famously 
responsible for the disastrous invasion of Iraq — calls for a constitutional amend-
ment to ban same-sex marriage in the United States.3 This call came after the 
United States government (under Bill Clinton) had already passed a Defense of 
Marriage Act36 that came under scrutiny in the courts. Commentators believe 
that Bush honed in on same-sex marriage in order to distract attention from the 
devastation his ‘war on terror’ caused in Iraq. In announcing the call for a con-
stitutional amendment Bush said: ‘Marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, 
religious and natural roots without weakening the good influence of society.’37 
On 6 June 2006, Bush repeated this call emphasising that ‘I believe those two 
words, “gay marriage” are a prostitution against the sacred word “marriage”’.38
‘Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.’39
29 Ibid.
30 ‘NG Church Admits to Having Insisted on Mixed Marriages Act’ SAPA ( August 1997).
31 CJ Dolan In War We Trust  The Bush Doctrine and the Pursuit of Just War (200) 132.
32 Ibid 1.
33 See Physicians for Human Rights The Taliban’s War on Women (1998).
34 Ibid 30-31. Also see H Ahmed-Gosh ‘A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the 
Future or Yesterday and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan’ (2003) 4(3) J of Int Women’s Studies 
1-1 and A Gerlin ‘Young Wives Often Face Abuse in Forced Marriages’ The Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel (9 December 2001).
3 Anon ‘Bush Calls for Ban on Same-Sex Marriages’ available at <http://www.cnn.com/2004/
ALLPOLITICS/02/24/elec04.prez.bush.marriage>.
36 D Westervelt ‘National Identity and the Defense of Marriage’ (2001) 8(1) Constellations 106.
37 ‘President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage’ available at <http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2 html>.
38 See <http://biblia com/bushbush4 htm>. The call was rejected by Congress twice. See <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/193136.stm>.
39 G Santayana The Life of Reason Vol I (190, 199) available at <http://www.gutenberg.
org/etext/1000>.
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II  IntRoductIon: totalItaRIanIsm and maRRIage
At the end of her monumental work, The Origins of Totalitarianism,40 Hannah 
Arendt emphasises the aspect of totalitarian domination as a form of govern-
ment that distinguishes it from all others: Totalitarianism is never content 
with the destruction of political life — it seeks the destruction of private life 
above and beyond all else.41 For Arendt, the success of totalitarianism depends 
fundamentally on the concept of isolation, because it is isolation that serves as 
the precursor to loneliness and it is loneliness that provides the fertile breeding 
ground for terror.42 Totalitarian domination ‘bases itself … on the experience 
of not belonging to the world at all, which is among the most radical and 
desperate experiences of man.’43
Indeed, totalitarianism can always be exposed by examining the continu-
ous, debilitating and terrifying interference by the state in the private, social 
aspects of citizens’ lives as well as state regulation of non-state social institu-
tions44 so as to compromise the freedom to act which will ensure (and promote) 
the loneliness of human beings. This loneliness is different from solitude 
in that the one who is lonely is subjected to the torture of being amongst 
others with whom she may not establish contact or to whose hostility she is 
exposed.4 In South Africa, the Constitutional Court has in fact recognised the 
promotion of loneliness as an aspect of past totalitarian rule. In abolishing the 
legal provisions that criminalised consensual, anal penetrative sex between 
two men Sachs J held that with the abolition of this crime, ‘a section of the 
community can feel the equal concern and regard of the Constitution and 
enjoy lives less threatened, less lonely and more dignified’46 than they were 
under the apartheid order.
Johan van der Vyfer points out that the ‘distinct bias for (a certain brand of) 
Christianity’ was one of the aspects that denoted the fabric of the apartheid 
regime as totalitarian.47 This religious bias was in fact an essential ingredient 
of the apartheid government’s totalitarian recipe. As is the case with all the 
examples cited in the preface, the church-state consubstantiality (in different 
permutations that are all the while more and more similar) provides a religious 
reason for the political perpetration of isolation and eventually loneliness that 
is required for terror to thrive. This particular brand of totalitarianism — one 
in which the church and the state remain literally inseparable and the church 
40 H Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (1966, 198) 474.
41 Ibid 47.
42 Ibid 474-47.
43 Ibid 47.
44 Ibid 474.
4 Ibid 476.
46 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 
1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para 130 (my emphasis).
47 JD van der Vyfer ‘Constitutional Perspective of Church-State Relations in South Africa’ (1991) 1 
Brigham Young Univ LR 63. Also see LM du Plessis ‘Religion, Law and State in South Africa’ 
(1997) 4 European J for Church and State Research 221, 223.
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at the behest of the state in the perpetration of human loneliness — is the 
totalitarianism par excellence.48
It is thus also no coincidence, as well as being a recurring motif of history (as 
the preface also aims to show), that a state wishing to institutionalise totalitarian 
domination will always have some form of prohibitive, hegemonic or coercive 
marriage law on its agenda, be it the prohibition of slave/free marriage, Jew/non-
Jew marriage, black/white marriage or the forced marriage of the Taliban which 
effectively prohibits a woman from exercising the choice to marry or not. All of 
these practices are totalitarian aims at isolation; aims to instil the sense that one no 
longer belongs to the world of the ‘human being’49 because one is not considered 
human because of who and what one immutably is. It is precisely because Arendt 
realised that totalitarianism’s affinity for loneliness is vividly exhibited in its pro-
hibitive laws in relation to marriage, that she argued in her later essay, ‘Reflections 
on Little Rock’,0 that the right to marry whoever one wishes1 is an elementary 
human right — a right that derives from our shared human existence.
It would indeed be dangerously complacent to believe that the all-consum-
ing fire of totalitarianism is extinguishable by the torrent of formal democratic 
rule. Such a belief would always be founded in a confusion of totalitarianism 
with totalitarian rule. Even in a country that harbours the most advanced and 
sophisticated institutions of democracy (and thus guards vehemently against 
totalitarian rule), totalitarianism will lurk, organise, even proliferate.2
In this article, I will critique the totalitarian aspects (totalitarianism) 
of the process that led to the enactment of same-sex marriage in South 
Africa. I will do this with reference to specifically three focus points 
which also happen to form essential parts of the core of any believable 
theory of democracy, namely church/state separation,3 plurality and equal 
48 See RF Miller ‘Church-State Relations and Civil Society in Former Communist Countries’ avail-
able at <http://law.anu.edu.au/nissl/rmiller.pdf>.
49 See the discussion of plurality, dignity and equality below. The ‘human being’ as I use it here bears 
all the plural dimensions and the dimensions of plurality described by Jean-Luc Nancy in his Being 
Singular Plural (2000).
0 H Arendt ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ (199) 6 (1) Dissent 4, 49.
1 Which of course also includes the right not to marry anyone and the right to be joined with another 
person in a union which does not carry the ‘marriage’ appellation.
2 See E Young-Bruehl Why Arendt Matters (2006) 46: ‘the elements of totalitarianism have continued 
to be with us, even in the most secure democracies, but they no longer take their mid-twentieth 
century forms.’
3 To clarify, ‘church’ and ‘state’ as I use the words here are intended to have a broad meaning. With 
‘church/state separation’ I intend to indicate not only the state’s separation from the Christian 
church but also a distancing from any particular religion in a way that leads to the state’s tolerance 
for religion but without any particular religious bias. The phrase ‘church-state’ would thus serve as a 
signifier referring to religious belief (intolerance?) practised as politics in the body of, for instance, 
the head of state (as is the case with President George Bush). I should stress from the outset that 
church/state separation as I use it here does not necessarily or inevitably preclude the even-handed 
treatment by the state of religions in a democracy — as is enjoined by the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the ‘Constitution’).
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moral citizenship.4 My primary argument will be that Parliament continu-
ously failed properly to heed all three of these fundamentals in the course 
of affording comprehensive legal protection — in the form of marriage 
— to same-sex couples. I regard these failures properly to heed the fun-
damentals of democracy not merely as negations of the political. Rather, 
I will suggest that these failures are in fact positive attempts grounded in 
totalitarianism. The configuration that emerges on this account cannot but 
confront the totalitarian moments — as totalitarian moments — that is to 
say not just as anti-democratic or politically vacuous moments — within 
the overtly democratic process that led to the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage in South Africa. As part of plausibly making this argument it will be 
necessary to enquire not only into the South African character of the three 
fundamental democratic concepts identified below but also into the way in 
which they have been employed and developed by the Constitutional Court 
to undo the legacy of our totalitarian past. It will then become necessary to 
interrogate the role these fundamentals of democracy played on different 
political sides during the LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered 
and Intersexed) liberation process in South Africa.
As is probably already clear, the theoretical framework that I propose (and 
support) here is heavily influenced by the political philosophy of Hannah 
Arendt. I will argue (as Arendt did) that the right to choose to marry whoever 
one pleases (or not to marry at all)6 is not only fundamental to a person’s life 
— it is also an essential ingredient in all struggles against the fundamental-
ist extremism that ceaselessly seeks the establishment of a totalitarian world 
order. However, (and for this fact there will be no apology), the voices that 
speak here are also those of Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière and Jacques 
Derrida for the reason that it is their thinking (in the wake of totalitarian-
ism) that demands a radicalisation of the democratic thought of the Left in a 
way that recognises and creatively resists the totalitarian potential of every 
new democratic day. It is because of my concern — in the context and in the 
course of the same-sex marriage debate in South Africa — with and for what 
Jacques Rancière has called the ‘hatred of democracy’7 that I believe it to be 
indispensable, as a matter of resistance, to link this debate to the conditions of 
politics and the nature of the South African democracy as not any democracy 
4 To be sure, these are of course not the only fundamentals of democracy. The Rule of Law, for 
instance, constitutes a widely considered fundamental of democracy that I will not directly discuss 
here. The reason for this relates primarily to the nature and consequences of the church/state separa-
tion that will be discussed here. Briefly, this discourse holds that the separation of the heteronymous 
(religious) order from the autonomous (political) order that is implied in the phrase ‘church/state 
separation’ leads to a political order that is, as a matter of its constitution and right from that 
moment, ruled by law — its own law. This is the original meaning of autonomy and the political as 
autonomous. In this way, church/state separation precedes the rule of law and on this understanding 
the rule of law is not an independent fundamental of democracy.
 The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 s 1 read with s 2(a).
6 See note 1 above.
7 J Rancière Hatred of Democracy (2006).
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amongst many, but specifically, as a post-totalitarian order founded on the 
rule of law.
III  chuRch/state sePaRatIon and the ‘PolItIcs’ of same-sex maRRIage 
In south afRIca
According to Jean-Luc Nancy, the separation of church and state is not one 
political possibility amongst others — it is the constitutive element of politics 
as such.8 The politics that Nancy speaks of is politics in the ancient sense 
— politics that bears an intimate relation with democracy.9 Today, the asser-
tion that ‘the separation of church and state is a cornerstone of democracy’ 
is almost as trite as asserting that the sky is blue. As Nancy contends, the 
separation is so fundamental to the very concept of demo-cracy60 that it has 
become a given.61 It is this ‘obviousness’ of the separation between church 
and state for democracy that often leaves the nature of the separation itself 
uninterrogated.
Given the oppressive history of the apartheid government, its promotion 
of, exclusively, ‘a Christian way of life’62 and its cosy relationship with the 
three Afrikaans ‘sister’ churches, it was imperative for the South African 
Constitution explicitly to arrange a separation of church and state that would 
not only ensure the legitimacy of the Constitution but would also put in place 
what Sachs J called in the Fourie63 judgment, the ‘mutual co-existence of the 
sacred and the secular’.64 This particular dispensation (as opposed to a strict 
church/state separation) was also required because of the high incidence of 
religious affiliation in South Africa.6
In accordance with a notion that could be termed ‘tolerant separation’, the 
vision of the new constitutional order (as a secular democratic order) holds 
that the state will never again employ the mechanisms of religion to indoc-
trinate political ideology. The obvious implication, of course, necessitates a 
commitment that the South African state would never again show a distinct 
bias for any particular religious conviction, denomination or brand. Because 
of the high incidence of religious affiliation in South Africa, the drafters 
of the Constitution wanted, however, to avoid the problems of too strict a 
church/state separation. These problems often exist around objections that 
too strict a separation of church and state leads to the increasing marginali-
8 JL Nancy ‘Church, State, Resistance’ (2007) 34(1) J of Law and Society 4.
9 Aristotle The Politics (trans TJ Saunder) 4. Also see J Derrida Rogues  Two Essays on Reason 
(trans PA Brault & M Naas, 200) 44 who speaks of ‘democracy and the political, these two regimes 
of the possible’; J Rancière On the Shores of Politics (2004) 97; and J Rancière (note 7 above) 23: 
‘politics as the Ancients had defined it was an art of living together and a search for the common 
good.’
60 Literally, the rule (-cracy) of the people (demos) (as opposed to God).
61 Nancy (note 8 above) 3.
62 Van der Vyfer (note 47 above) 636-637 mentions the many Acts that the apartheid Parliament passed 
in order to establish totalitarianism by interfering in the private sphere of citizens’ lives.
63 Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Others 2006 (1) SA 24 (CC).
64 Ibid para 94.
6 See Du Plessis (note 47 above) 221.
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sation of religion in society so that the right to freedom of religion becomes 
a right to freedom from religion.66 Read together with ss 9(3),67 1868 and 
31(1)69 of the Constitution, the freedom of religion regime in South Africa 
thus entails that everyone has the right to the free exercise of religion, belief 
and opinion and that no one has the right unfairly to discriminate against 
a person on the grounds of religion. Moreover, the state is enjoined to treat 
religions even-handedly, refraining from any particular religious bias.
South Africa’s freedom of religion regime (read with the right to freedom 
of expression70 which prohibits hate speech) of course also entails that the 
religious beliefs of some cannot be used to silence the expression of religious 
beliefs (or beliefs about religion) held by others — to the extent that the 
expression of religious beliefs of one religion (or the beliefs about religion 
of some) cannot reasonably be construed as advocacy of hate speech based 
on religion in terms of s 16(2)(c).71 But perhaps more importantly for current 
purposes, as Sachs J held in the Fourie matter, the religious beliefs of some 
cannot be used to determine the constitutional rights of others.72 This must be 
so not merely because the constitutional rights of persons are created by the 
political, secular order (the state) but also because of the more foundational 
notion that relates to the very nature of the political as autonomous73 — ruled 
by the laws that come from itself. As Nancy emphasises, the only religion that 
is proper to a democracy is religion without theocracy.74
But many (and certainly not all) of the religions of democracy (in the sense 
of them being in democracy) are never fully able to accept this castration. 
66 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook ed (200) 289. Also see LM du Plessis ‘Freedom 
of or Freedom from Religion? An Overview of Issues Pertinent to the Constitutional Protection of 
Religious Rights and Freedom in “the New South Africa”’ (2001) 2 Brigham Young Univ LR 439.
67 ‘The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.’
68 ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of association.’
69 ‘Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, 
with other members of that community to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their 
language; and to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other 
organs of civil society.’
70 Constitution s 16(1): ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes-
(a) freedom of the press and other media;
(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;
(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and
(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.’
71 ‘The right in subsection (1) does not extend to- …(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, 
ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.’
72 Fourie (note 63 above) para 92.
73 Nancy (note 8 above)  makes the point that the political gives itself its own laws. It is thus 
autonomous (from the Greek auto (self) and nomos (law)) or self-legislative. On the other hand, 
religion is by definition heteronomous: God (the one who is wholly heteros/other) gives the law. 
Nancy’s strict distinction is perhaps too idealistic and is perhaps also open to ethical charges rooted 
in Derrida’s work on messianism without a messiah or the heteronomy of the Other. This is a matter 
that I cannot address here save for pointing out that the very autonomy of the political necessarily 
already points to an ethic beyond it and thus, in a certain sense, emphasises the aporetic relation of 
the ethical to the political.
74 Nancy (note 8 above) .
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Melancholically obsessed with the loss of their rule over the demos (others), 
some of these religions (of democracy) often continue to tout theocracy. The 
other side of the coin all too often becomes Rancière’s notion of the hatred of 
democracy. As Rancière argues, democracy is synonymous with abomina-
tion for those who still believe that revelations of divine law constitute ‘the 
sole legitimate foundation on which to organise human communities’.7 Such 
religions become political as well as religious, or, to put it differently, their 
practice becomes religion as a politics.76 For Arendt, these religions are not 
authentic because authentic religions are religions that are not of the political 
world but part of the private world and, although the free world should permit 
and even encourage them plurally, religious belief should not be allowed to be 
adapted for the purposes of political ideology.77 As she notes in her 193 essay 
on religion and politics:
If we try to inspire public-political life once more with ‘religious passion’ or to use religion as 
a means of political distinctions, the result may very well be the transformation and perver-
sion of religion into an ideology and the corruption of our fight against totalitarianism by a 
fanaticism which is utterly alien to the very essence of freedom.78
The desire for theocracy (or perhaps more accurately, the primordial 
tension between theocracy and democracy — which is always already the 
fundamental tension between the heteronymous and the autonomous) is sure 
to present itself forcefully during the process by which a secular order pur-
ports to change the heterosexual definition of marriage as the lifelong union 
between a man and a woman. With the sincerely held but hopelessly confused 
belief that marriage is fundamentally a religious (theocratic) institution (rather 
than a secular, civil arrangement),79 an overwhelming majority of religious 
institutions right from the beginning of the struggle for same-sex marriage in 
South Africa (and elsewhere) vehemently opposed it.80 This opposition sowed 
the seeds of totalitarianism in that it constituted an attempt not only to deny 
certain humans their dignity or to curtail a basic freedom of human beings 
— it also attempted (once again) politically to delegitimise the sexuality of 
7 Rancière (note 7 above) 2.
76 Ibid.
77 H Arendt ‘Religion and Politics’ in H Arendt Essays in Understanding1930-1954 (1994, 200) 368. 
Also see Young-Bruehl (note 2 above) 49-0.
78 Ibid 384.
79 See the incisive judgment of Farlam JA in Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others 200 (3) SA 429 (SCA), paras 68-80, particularly at para 80: ‘the law is concerned only 
with marriage as a secular institution. It is true that it is seen by many to have a religious dimension 
also, but that is something with which the law is not concerned.’ Also see generally PL Reynolds 
Marriage in the Western Church  The Christianisation of Marriage During the Patristic and Early 
Medieval Periods (2001).
80 See the various submissions filed on behalf of the following religious institutions during the pub-
lic participation hearings on the Civil Union Bill 26 of 2006 available at <http://www.pmg.org.
za/viewminute.php?id=8331> and <http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=830>: Doctors 
for Life and John Smythe personally, His People Christian Ministries, Southern African Bishops’ 
Conference, Muslim Judicial Council, Christian Lawyers Association, Christian Brethren Church, 
Christian Action Network, Defense for Marriage, Christian View Network, Couples for Christ, 
Marriage Alliance of South Africa and the Consultation of Christian Churches which claimed to 
represent 37 denominations in South Africa.
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some so that they would once more be driven into the darkness of invisibility 
and would once again be successfully isolated and thus susceptible to the 
debilitation on which terror insists.
The presumptuousness of the religious opposition to same-sex marriage 
specifically in South Africa — one could even go so far as to say the fanatical 
desire for theocracy or absolute heteronomy — completely ignored the fact 
that our Constitution (the source of our political order and thus also the source 
of the autonomy of such an order) prohibits unfair discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation.81 This political practice (politicisation) of reli-
gion led to an abuse of the generous rights afforded to religious groupings by 
the Constitution. The tolerance and even-handed treatment of religion envis-
aged by the Constitution turned into the permission of religious groupings 
to espouse hate speech against those who do not share their religious views 
about love, sexuality and sexual orientation.82 But perhaps most importantly, 
the presumptuousness of this practice of religion as hegemonic politics was 
founded in a disdainful intolerance all too characteristic of radical totali-
tarianism, namely the disdainful intolerance for that which is constitutive of 
distinctively human83 life — plurality. 84
IV  PluRalIty, equalIty, dIgnIty … and fReedom
(a) Plurality, equality and dignity
In The Human Condition Arendt writes that plurality is ‘the condition — … 
— of all political life’.8 For her, plurality is both the conditio sine qua non 
and per quam of political life and as such it is what guards most successfully 
against the success of totalitarianism,86 primarily because plurality does not 
politically conceive the concept of the human being in a monistic way. Human 
being is for Arendt politically conceivable only as the plurality of human 
beings. There are many places in her work where she emphasises that men 
(different people and peoples) (not man)87 inhabit the world and that the prepa-
ration for totalitarianism has begun when people (through terror and tyranny) 
lose contact with their fellow men.88 For Arendt plurality is fundamental to 
81 See Constitution s 9(3) (note 67 above).
82 See the discussion of these aspects in more detail below.
83 Hamacher (note 9 above) 343 indicates that for the ancient Greeks political society is constitutive 
of the human.
84 What Sachs J called in the first National Coalition judgment (note 46 above) para 138, ‘the vari-
ability of the human kind.’
8 Arendt (note 2 above) 7 (emphasis in the original).
86 Arendt (note 40 above) 466: ‘the iron band of terror, which destroys the plurality of men and makes 
out of many the One …’ and 467: ‘In a perfect totalitarian government, where all men have become 
One Man …’
87 See JR Lupton ‘Hannah Arendt’s Renaissance: Remarks on Natality’ (2006) 7(2) J for Cultural and 
Religious Theory 10 who shows convincingly that by shadowing the classical scene of interaction 
among male citizens with the Hebrew creation story in the opening paragraphs of The Human 
Condition, Arendt implicitly merges both sexual difference and religious difference into founding 
aspects of plurality.
88 See, for instance, Arendt (note 40 above) 476 and Arendt (note 2 above) 4.
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human life because it is plurality (the existence of other, different people in 
the world) that validates our experiences as reality. Even more importantly, it 
is plurality that enables us to think,89 which thus distinguishes us as human. 
And tyrannical forms of government destroy absolutely the plurality of peo-
ples amongst others and amongst themselves.
In the course of its jurisprudence on freedom of religion, our Constitutional 
Court has touched on plurality as a cornerstone of democratic politics. In 
the Christian Education90 case, the Court held that the provisions of the 
Constitution that protect the rights of members of communities (specifically 
s 12) ‘underline the constitutional value of acknowledging diversity and plu-
ralism in our society.’91 These provisions affirm
the right of people to be who they are without being forced to subordinate themselves to 
the cultural and religious norms of others, and highlight the importance of individuals and 
communities being able to enjoy what has been called ‘the right to be different’.92
The Court went on to affirm the right to depart from a general norm and 
celebrated the ‘rich tapestry constituted by civil society’.93 It continued to deal 
explicitly with the importance of protecting members of minority groups in 
society and acknowledged that minorities might well be ‘specially reliant on 
constitutional protection, particularly if they express their beliefs in a way that 
the majority regard as unusual, bizarre or even threatening.’94 In the Prince9 
matter, Sachs J further held that ‘[t]he test of tolerance as envisaged by the Bill 
of Rights comes not in accepting what is familiar and easily accommodated, 
but in giving reasonable space to what is “unusual, bizarre or even threaten-
ing”’.96 As part of the respect for and maintenance of plurality, held the Court, 
it is particularly important to be conscious of past practices that abused the 
notion of plurality ‘to achieve exclusivity, privilege and domination.’97
Outside its limited freedom of religion jurisprudence, the Constitutional 
Court has, on a number of occasions, confirmed the importance of plurality 
for the transformation of South African civil society.98 In National Coalition 
89 Arendt (note 40 above) 476. See the conclusion below.
90 Christian Education of South Africa v The Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 77 (CC).
91 Ibid para 24.
92 Ibid. See also P Longo ‘Revisiting the Equality/Difference Debate: Redefining Citizenship for 
the New Millenium’ (2001) (3) Citizenship Studies 269, 270: ‘The accent placed on “difference” 
evokes the aspiration to effect a social change more radical than that arising from the ideology of 
equal opportunity prevailing in most capitalist countries in the last decade.’
93 Christian Education of South Africa (note 90 above) para 24.
94 Ibid para 2.
9 Prince v President, Cape Law Society, and Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC).
96 Ibid para 172.
97 Christian Education of South Africa (note 90 above) para 26.
98 See for example Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 20: ‘Our country has diverse 
communities with different historical experiences and living conditions. Until recently, very many 
areas of public and private life were invaded by systematic legal separateness coupled with legally 
enforced advantage and disadvantage. The impact of structured and vast inequality is still with us 
despite the arrival of the new constitutional order.’
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for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Justice and Others99 
Ackermann J explicitly linked plurality with the constitutional guarantee of 
equality and opposed it to the totalitarian South African past: ‘The desire for 
equality is not a hope for the elimination of all differences. “The experience 
of subordination — of personal subordination, above all — lies behind the 
vision of equality.”’100
The linking of plurality with equality in a way that affirms difference 
is markedly Arendtian (although seldom attributed to her). In The Human 
Condition she writes that ‘[p]lurality is the condition of human action because 
we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the 
same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live.’101 The first National 
Coalition judgment marks the Court’s strongest,102 unequivocal affirmation 
that plurality fundamentally depends on difference, that equal respect for dif-
ference is at the heart of equality103 and that equality depends, in great part, on 
the protection of minorities:
It is easy to say that everyone who is just like ‘us’ is entitled to equality. Everyone finds it 
more difficult to say that those who are ‘different’ from us in some way should have the 
same equality rights that we enjoy. Yet as soon as we say any … group is less deserving and 
unworthy of equal protection and benefit of the law all minorities and all of … society are 
demeaned. It is so deceptively simple and so devastatingly injurious to say that those who 
are handicapped or of a different race, or religion, or colour or sexual orientation are less 
worthy.104
Per Sachs J the Court also emphasised that
the Constitution does not presuppose that a holder of rights is an isolated, lonely and abstract 
figure possessing a disembodied and socially disconnected self. It acknowledges that people 
live in their bodies, their communities, their cultures, their places and their times.10
The Court also considered that social minorities (in this case the South 
African LGBTI community) constitute political minorities, meaning that 
they cannot depend on political power to secure favourable legislation. 
Accordingly, they are almost exclusively dependant on the Bill of Rights for 
protection.106 This is a point that Arendt emphasised already in a 194 essay 
in which she attempted to come to terms with totalitarianism; namely that a 
99 Note 46 above.
100 Prinsloo (note 98 above) para 22 (footnote omitted). 
101 Arendt (note 2 above) 8.
102 See the earlier judgment in The President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 
(4) SA 1 (CC) para 41: ‘At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition 
that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in 
which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership 
of particular groups.’
103 National Coalition (note 46 above) para 112.
104 Ibid para 22.
10 Ibid para 117.
106 Ibid para 2.
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democracy ruled by majority decisions but unchecked by the rule of law is as 
despotic as an autocracy.107
In the instant judgment, the Court went so far as to hold that the success of 
the entire constitutional endeavour will be measured by how successfully it 
reconciles sameness and differences,108 which I read as a different way of say-
ing that the success of the entire constitutional endeavour will depend on how 
successfully it nurtures plurality.109 In an obiter statement Sachs J also high-
lighted that the protection of dignity under s 10 ‘offers protection to persons in 
their multiple identities and capacities.’110 Plurality thus sits at the heart of the 
constitutional endeavour: ‘[w]hat the Constitution requires is that the law and 
public institutions acknowledge the variability of human beings and affirm 
the equal respect and concern that should be shown to all as they are.’111
The Court was careful to point out that plurality as a condition of politics 
certainly does not entail that anything goes.112 It pointed out that the Bill of 
Rights is a document of deep political morality and its enforcement itself is 
an enforcement of morality.113 The Court, however, affirmed that the morality 
that the state enforces through the Bill of Rights is a secular morality: ‘the dic-
tates of the morality which it enforces, and the limits to which it may go, are to 
be found in the text and spirit of the Constitution itself.’114 Above everything, 
the first National Coalition judgment is, in the end, a judgment that celebrates 
plurality as the heart of the political.11 For this reason it is fundamentally a 
judgment about the nature of and conditions for democratic politics, which is 
the only politics worthy of the name.
(b) Plurality, marriage and family formation in South Africa
From the outset of the constitutional endeavour, the Constitutional Court has 
acknowledged the plurality that inheres in modern South African family for-
mations. In the First Certification case116 the Court acknowledged that families 
are constituted, function and are dissolved in a variety of ways, and that laws 
or executive action resulting in enforced marriages, or oppressive prohibi-
tions on marriage or the choice of spouses, would not survive constitutional 
107 ‘On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding’ in H Arendt Essays in Understanding 
1930-1954 (1994, 200) 328, 331.
108 National Coalition (note 46 above) para 131.
109 In light of the Court’s statement that it is plurality that brings life to any society (ibid para 132).
110 Ibid para 124.
111 Ibid para 134.
112 Ibid para 136.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
11 See JWG van der Walt Law and Sacrifice (200) 6-12, 20-2. This is not the occasion to engage with 
the arguments that insist on the impossibility of plurality and the evacuation of the political in Van 
der Walt’s inspiring and thoughtful book, save for indicating that I believe Van der Walt’s arguments 
in this regard illustrate precisely and perhaps devastatingly the totalitarian tendencies of everyday 
political life under late global capitalism (what Van der Walt calls international feudalism).
116 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly  In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 99.
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challenge.117 This sentiment was repeated in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs and Others,118 where the Court 
also affirmed that ‘it is not for the state to choose or to arrange the choice of 
[marriage] partner, but for the partners to choose themselves.’ Underlying this 
proscription is, of course, a very well-developed concern with plurality; an 
acknowledgment that marriage partners come in all shapes and sizes and that 
the choice to marry a particular person is a highly personal one. Later, in the 
Du Toit case,119 Skweyiya J emphasised that family life as contemplated by 
the Constitution could be provided in a variety of different ways all worthy of 
constitutional protection.
In Fourie the Court explicitly acknowledged that the extension of marriage 
to permanent same-sex life partnerships was a matter of the protection of 
equality and dignity and thus of plurality.120 The opening of the institution 
of marriage was thus also a distinctively democratic political gesture that 
affirmed the rule of law and celebrated secularity.
The reasons for the extension of specifically ‘marriage’ to the LGBTI commu-
nity — as a matter of plurality — relate primarily to the importance (centrality) 
attributed to marriage in South African civil society. Throughout its jurispru-
dence on marriage, the Court has acknowledged the argument that marriage 
is central to the distribution of benefits in politics and that it is only because 
marriage is one of the central territories of cultural privilege that it becomes an 
important site of exclusion.121 In Dawood122 O’Regan J held that marriage and 
the family are social institutions of vital importance not only because of their 
personal significance but also because ‘human beings are social beings whose 
humanity is expressed through their relationships with others’.123
As emphasised in Fourie, the words ‘I do’ have both an intensely private and 
an overtly public (political in the ancient sense) dimension to them.124 The public 
dimension prescribes certain formalities for the marriage in order to ensure the 
publication of the marriage to the broader community — ‘marriage’ is thus 
taken seriously not only by the parties, their families and society, but [also] by 
the State.’12 And it is taken seriously by the state because, as Derrida affirms, 
‘the concept of politics rarely announces itself without some sort of adherence of 
117 Ibid para 100.
118 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para .
119 Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others (Lesbian and 
Gay Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC).
120 In Fourie (note 79 above) para 113 Farlam JA followed the same route by holding that ‘the concepts 
of marriage and the family have to be seen against the background of the numerous strands making 
up the variegated tapestry of life in South Africa.’
121 Westervelt (note 36 above) 106-107.
122 Dawood and Another v Minister Of Home Affairs And Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister Of 
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister Of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 
936 (CC).
123 Ibid para 30. This approach to marriage was endorsed in Satchwell v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another 2003 (4) SA 266 (CC) and Volks NO v Robinson 200 () BCLR 446 
(CC).
124 Fourie (note 63 above) para 63.
12 Ibid para 64.
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the State to the family.’126 And, under a Constitution that recognises plurality as 
one of its political foundations, the politics of the family will have to announce 
itself constrained (or perhaps informed) by this very notion of plurality.
The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage as a pillar of civil society 
is thus ‘not a small and tangential inconvenience resulting from a few surviv-
ing relics of societal prejudice destined to evaporate like the morning dew.’127 
It represents a harsh statement that same-sex unions are not worthy of the 
same protection because they do not conform to the heterosexual norm.
However, the Constitutional Court has been careful to point out that the open-
ing-up of marriage does not constitute a hegemonic attempt to make same-sex 
couples conform to the heterosexual norm.128 This would invariably reduce the 
plurality that the Constitution aims to protect. What was in issue was both the 
legitimacy of families constituted in ways different from the heterosexual norm 
as well as the choice that was available to such families. In short: Given the 
centrality of marriage in our society, ‘[i]f heterosexual couples have the option 
of deciding whether to marry or not, so should same-sex couples,’129 because 
there is no rational justification that could form the basis of their exclusion from 
the institution that carries this appellation. Any different outcome would have 
resulted in a denial of equality, difference and thus of plurality.
The Fourie judgment deferred the opening-up of marriage to include same-
sex life partnerships to the legislature for a period of one year from the date 
of the judgment.130 This deferral stood in sharp contrast to the Constitutional 
Court’s overt counter-totalitarian acknowledgment of the secular, inclusive 
and plural dimensions throughout its jurisprudence on sexual freedom and the 
institution of marriage. For when all was said and done, South Africa’s LGBTI 
society had to live for up to another year with the denial of their dignity, 
equality and freedom. The realisation that this was the practical effect of the 
majority’s judgment lay at the heart of O’Regan J’s dissent, which recognised 
that the majority’s order not only deviated from the important constitutional 
principle that successful litigants must generally be afforded the relief they 
seek.131 As O’Regan J frankly noted, the real practical effect of the majority’s 
decision, after all, was that gay and lesbian couples would not be permitted 
to marry during the period of suspension of the order.132 This order was also 
particularly problematic in that it failed to confront the historical fact that the 
state had opposed all the cases in which constitutional relief was sought for 
the LGBTI community.133 In addition, given the Constitutional Court’s explicit 
confrontation with the religious views of the majority of the population, a 
hiatus in the judgment suggests a failure to come to terms with the possible 
126 J Derrida Politics of Friendship (1997) viii.
127 Fourie (note 63 above) para 71.
128 Ibid paras 72 and 107.
129 Ibid para 72.
130 Ibid para 162.
131 Ibid paras 16 and 170.
132 Ibid para 167.
133 This fact alone was in itself totalitarian. 
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consequences of deferring to the legislative process within this political con-
text, namely that it is precisely the judgment that created the space for the 
expression of these religious views during public participation. To be sure, the 
Constitutional Court cannot be blamed for the fact that Parliament allowed the 
expression of homophobic religious views during public participation. This, 
however, does not absolve the Court’s responsibility to consider the probable 
consequences — the fact that it is probable that more unjustifiable harm could 
come to the LGBTI community — which result from the suspension of the 
order.
Given the history of the state’s role in the preceding litigation, it was per-
haps not surprising that Parliament’s response to the Fourie judgment bore 
the distinct characteristics of totalitarianism in the making. Why is this not a 
far-fetched contention? Let us recall that in Fourie the Court expressly stated 
that any remedy that would lead to a ‘separate but equal’ marriage regime for 
same-sex couples would not only hark back to the tactics of the totalitarian 
apartheid government, it would for this very reason be ‘unthinkable’134 in our 
constitutional order.13 Yet this is precisely the regime that Parliament proposed 
in the first draft of the Civil Union Bill.136 This Bill did not provide marriage to 
same-sex life partnerships but instead sought to enact a second-class institution 
called a ‘civil partnership’ regime exclusively for same-sex couples.137 With the 
proposal of this Bill the writing was on the wall that the political will was (at 
best) reluctant to grant equal rights of marriage to same-sex couples. A further 
implication of this move was that the legislature itself (albeit tacitly and perhaps 
even unconsciously) expressed an intolerance for the plurality of South African 
society so celebrated by the Constitutional Court. It is for this reason that the Bill 
was met with the outrage it deserved from the South African LGBTI society.138
But coming back to where the previous section left off, what was even 
more alarming was the intolerance for plurality expressed by the members of 
numerous religious groups.139 While the LGBTI society regarded the Bill as an 
insult in that it did not go far enough, religious groups regarded it as a moral 
134 Fourie (note 63 above) para 11.
13 Y Merin Equality for Same-Sex Couples  The Legal Recognition of Gay Partnerships in Europe 
and the United States (2002) 279 links separate-but-equal doctrine with second-class citizenship: 
‘The fact that the [separate but equal] models are self-consciously separate from marriage renders 
them inherently unequal to opposite-sex marriage; “separate but equal” in this context instantiates 
the same constitutional evil that led the US Supreme Court to condemn this doctrine in the racial 
domain. This is yet another reason why marriage substitutes constitute second-class marriage. The 
only remedy for the existing discrimination against same-sex couples would be their inclusion in 
the institution of marriage.’
136 Bill 26 of 2006.
137 Ibid s 1: ‘“civil partnership” means the voluntary union of two adult persons of the same sex that is 
solemnized and registered in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Act to the exclusion, 
while it lasts, of all others’.
138 Anon ‘Separate Law on Marriage is Apartheid’ Cape Argus (7 September 2006); J du Plessis ‘Gay 
Activists See Red over Civil Union Bill’ Pretoria News (18 October 2006); WJ da Costa ‘Activists 
Slam Hearings on Same-Sex Unions’ Pretoria News (11 October 2006). 
139 For a taste of this intolerance see I Kuppan & A Quintal ‘Churches Speak out Against New Marriage 
Bill’ Daily News (2 August 2006) and L Daniels ‘Civil Union Law Elicits Strong Emotions’ The 
Star (24 November 2006).
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disaster because, in their opinion, it went too far.140 While it was clear that the 
Bill was not allowing same-sex marriage, religious groups argued that even 
granting civil partnerships to same-sex couples would defile the institution 
of marriage, which they believed to be sacred.141 Instead of informing these 
groups that (1) the Constitutional Court had already dealt with and dismissed 
— as a constitutional or political matter — the religious arguments against 
same-sex marriage; and (2) the Bill was in fact not providing marriage to 
same-sex couples, Parliament instead provided these religious groupings (as 
part of the legislative process) with a platform from which to express some of 
the most ludicrous, hurtful and unfounded opinions about same-sex love that 
have ever been conceived — all based on naked and irrational hatred (yes, 
hatred, not benign naiveté based on the reading of religious text and belief in 
its authority) of those who wish to act out their homosexuality.142
Arendt suggests that when hatred starts playing a central role in public 
affairs (as it did in this case), democratic politics is under threat and totalitari-
anism is at the political door.143 The religious groupings that decided to voice 
their opposition in the form of hate speech neither cared for, nor did they value 
or even come to accept, the equal respect for plurality that lies at the heart of 
this constitutional order. Moreover, they failed to appreciate the simple fact 
that they are religions of democracy — tolerated, even encouraged, but never 
licensed to determine the constitutional rights of others.
V  cItIzenshIP: the RIght to haVe RIghts
Arendt famously argued that only the concrete rights of citizens carried weight.144 
She believed that the danger in describing human rights as inalienable exists in 
basing them in an abstract individual who exists nowhere.14 Her unease with 
such a description of human rights must be viewed in the context of her discus-
sion of totalitarianism. The isolation required for the success of totalitarianism 
cannot be fully implemented without the annihilation of the common citizenship 
of the polity. Taking away a political subject’s citizenship serves as a shortcut by 
way of which the subject’s other human rights are alienated (save to the extent 
that these rights are retained in the abstract sense) because those rights largely 
depend on (and are grounded in) citizenship for their enforcement.
Because of her concern with the protection of plurality as the condition 
of all true politics, Arendt insisted that the equal granting of the status of 
140 A march was in fact organised to protest against this first draft. See Anon ‘March Aims to 
Protect “Traditional Marriage”’ Independent Online available at <http://www.iol.co.za>; T 
Nthite ‘Hundreds Protest Against Same-Sex Marriages’ Pretoria News (9 October 2006); SAPA 
‘Marchers Protest Against Same-Sex Marriages’ available at <http://www.iol.co.za/index.
php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=qw1160209980970B216>. 
141 See note 80 above. On the secularity of marriage also see BH Bix ‘State Interest and Marriage 
— The Theoretical Perspective’ (2004) 32 Hofstra LR 93.
142 See WJ da Costa ‘Hearings “A Platform for Hate Speech”’ Cape Times (11 October 2006) and WJ 
da Costa ‘Gays Protest Tone of Civil Union Bill Debate’ Cape Times (16 October 2006).
143 Arendt (note 40 above) 268.
144 Ibid. 
14 Ibid 291.
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citizenship is the very condition for the protection of such plurality. To put 
it differently, according to Arendt’s formulation, I need to have citizenship 
like everyone else in order to protect my individual status as one who is ‘like’ 
no one.146 Thus, the very fact that we are all human entitles us to the citizen-
ship with which we are ensured of our human rights.147 Without it, our human 
rights are literally and ceaselessly exposed to alienation.
Arendt notes that the totalitarianism of the twentieth century brutally indi-
cated exactly how alienable the so-called inalienable rights are when they are 
not grounded in citizenship.148 This is what Hitler realised in Nazi Germany 
when he decreed that all Jews were no longer German citizens. This is also what 
the apartheid government realised with the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act 
26 of 1970 which decreed the removal of the South African citizenship of black 
people and compelled them to become citizens of the homeland that responded 
to their ethnic group, regardless of whether they had ever lived there or not.149 
Of course, the so-called ‘independent’ homelands remained under the practi-
cal control of the apartheid government and thus served primarily as the loci 
to which black South Africans were relegated after the apartheid government 
divested them of their South African citizenship and the rights (particularly in 
terms of politics and civility) that such a citizenship would attract.
The premise upon which the exclusion from citizenship — as a denial of human 
rights — of Jews and black people was based under totalitarianism generally, 
consisted in the general belief of the members of the totalitarian movement/s that 
these human beings were (at best) less human than them and thus not entitled 
to the same common (shared)10 citizenship. This belief in the ‘less human’, for 
its part, was founded on the idea that the Jews in the case of Germany and the 
black people in the case of South Africa did not possess the same moral and ethi-
cal capacity that the oppressors believed themselves to have been born with. In 
short, the citizenship of these people was excluded because of the belief that they 
were morally inferior and thus not deserving of the same citizenship as those who 
were supposedly ‘superior’. For this reason, the oppressors in South Africa, for 
instance, thought it necessary to segregate society along racial lines.
From a purely formal (and immensely important) point of view, the South 
African Constitution ensured that it would never again be possible (after the 
disintegration of apartheid) legally to conceive of the exclusion of some South 
Africans from South African citizenship. There is now a common South African 
citizenship affirmed by the Constitution.11 Because the right to citizenship is 
linked with equality, there can be no classes of citizenship in South Africa.12 
146 Arendt (note 107 above) 333.
147 See E Balibar ‘Outlines of a Topography of Cruelty: Citizenship and Civility in the Era of Global 
Violence’ (2001) 8(1) Constellations 1, 17-18.
148 Arendt (note 107 above) 293.
149 See J Klaaren ‘Post-Apartheid Citizenship in South Africa’ in T Aleinikoff & DB Klusmeyer (ed) 
From Migrants to Citizens  Membership in a Changing World (2000) 221.
10 See the argument relating to the partage below.
11 Constitution ss 3 & 20.
12 See s 9(1) of the Constitution. Also see Currie & De Waal (note 66 above) 367.
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This was acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in Hugo where it held that 
‘“distinctions that treat certain people as second-class citizens, that demean 
them, that treat them as less capable for no good reason, or that otherwise offend 
fundamental human dignity” cannot be tolerated.’13 Currie and De Waal cor-
rectly indicate that only citizens enjoy the political rights of the Constitution. 
Thus if South African people did not formally have the right to claim equal 
status as citizens, it would be impossible for them to negotiate the required 
agency that is needed to play their equal roles in the political realm.14
Out of the importance Arendt placed on common citizenship (as shared, equal 
citizenship) she discerned her notion of civic friendship which affirms the two 
dimensions of her conception of the public sphere, namely the space of appear-
ance and the enormity of the idea of sharing a common world.1 The space of 
appearance endorses, gives ontological significance to plurality.16 The common 
world provides some permanence to the always precarious space of appearance; 
it is the backdrop: ‘a shared and public world of human artefacts, institutions 
and settings which separates us from nature and which provides a relatively 
permanent and durable context for our activities.’17 The denial of equal citizen-
ship thus threatens the very possibility of politics and a public sphere as such 
because it renders the recovery of a common, shared world impossible.
Arendt’s conception of citizenship as sharing a common world is perhaps best 
captured by Nancy’s notion of the partage — that which indicates sharing at the 
same time as it indicates division or separation,18 or as Derrida puts it, ‘at once 
partition and participation, something possible only on the basis of an irreducible 
spacing.’19 Arendt herself compares the common world to sitting around a table 
with others — ‘the world, like any in-between, relates and separates men at the 
same time’.160 For Arendt totalitarianism destroys the space between people and 
thereby destroys the very heart of civic friendship. Under totalitarianism, shar-
ing (the partage) is no longer a possibility. It is also when this sharing is destroyed 
that freedom lies in ruins, because freedom (as that which ‘throws the subject 
into the space of the sharing of being’) cannot be experienced without this space 
between men.161 Moreover, because equality is integral to freedom in that the 
equal sharing of freedom is its unconditional condition, the destruction of the 
13 Hugo (note 102 above) para 41. Repeated in Volks (note 123 above) para 79.
14 Currie & De Waal (note 66 above) 364. The Constitution of course also affirms the most impor-
tant of the fundamental rights of non-citizens and thus also points to a cosmopolitical notion of 
citizenship.
1 Arendt (note 40 above) 464.
16 See B Assy ‘Doxa: Dignifying the Public Space in Hannah Arendt’ (2004) 9 theory@buffalo 11.
17 Arendt (note 2 above) 199. See MP D’Entreves ‘Hannah Arendt’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt>.
18 JL Nancy The Experience of Freedom (1993) 66-80.
19 Derrida (note 9 above) 4.
160 Arendt (note 2 above) 2.
161 Arendt (note 40 above) 466: ‘for the space between men is the living space of freedom.’ Also see 
Nancy (note 18 above) 69-71; Derrida (note 9 above) 46-47. In order to justify the specific use 
of language in my choice of formulation as well as to acknowledge the debt of both Nancy, Derrida 
and perhaps (but only perhaps) even Arendt, it is necessary also to refer here to M Heidegger Being 
and Time (trans J Macquarrie & E Robinson, 1962) 174.
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space between men also ruins equality162 and, seeing that equality bears such 
an intimate relationship with human dignity in South Africa, the destruction of 
equality leads to the ruination of dignity. Under the crushing force of the iron 
band of terror the great emancipatory ideals collapse like dominoes.
Well aware of this domino effect, Arendt’s notion of ‘thick’ citizenship 
pleads for more than the mere formal granting of equal (common) citizenship. 
It is Arendt’s notion of citizenship as the acknowledgment of worth;163 of the 
full and active (and thus equal right to) participation in the public sphere that 
has been developed by the Constitutional Court (primarily by Sachs J) and 
referred to as ‘full moral citizenship’. Sachs J famously opened his judgment 
in the first National Coalition case with the following words:
Only in the most technical sense is this a case about who may penetrate whom where. At a 
practical and symbolical level it is about the status, moral citizenship and sense of self-worth of 
a significant section of the community. At a more general and conceptual level, it concerns the 
nature of the open, democratic and pluralistic society contemplated by the Constitution.164
Sachs J went on to hold that ‘[i]n the case of gays, history and experience teach 
us that the scarring comes not from poverty or powerlessness, but from invisibil-
ity’.16 The judgment repeatedly acknowledges that the discrimination against the 
LGBTI community exists as an attempt to erase their space of appearance.166 By 
casting this case as being about full moral citizenship, appearance and plurality 
(rather than just about privacy), Sachs J affirmed that the decriminalization of 
homosexual conduct and the granting of equal rights to the LGBTI community 
are fundamental ingredients for nurturing the profundity of full common citi-
zenship for South African democracy and politics.
Sachs J’s notion of moral citizenship also acknowledges that the formal 
extension and enjoyment of a common citizenship is but a precondition (albeit 
a very important one) of moral citizenship: ‘The development of an active 
rather than a purely formal sense of enjoying a common citizenship depends 
on recognising and accepting people as they are.’167 In Fourie Sachs J built on 
this notion of equal moral citizenship by holding that:
The strength of the nation envisaged by the Constitution comes from its capacity to embrace 
all its members with dignity and respect. In the words of the Preamble, South Africa belongs 
to all who live in it, united in diversity. What is at stake in this case, then, is how to respond 
to legal arrangements of great social significance under which same-sex couples are made to 
feel like outsiders who do not fully belong in the universe of equals.168
162 Derrida (note 9 above); Rancière (note 9 above) 84-91.
163 National Coalition (note 46 above) para 127. Sachs J specifically links the acknowledgment of full 
moral citizenship to the acknowledgment of the innate self-worth of human beings (dignity).
164 Ibid para 107.
16 Ibid para 127.
166 Ibid para 128: ‘Gays constitute a distinct though invisible section of the community that has been 
treated not only with disrespect or condescension but with disapproval and revulsion; they are not 
generally obvious as a group, pressurised by society and the law to remain invisible.’
167 Ibid para 134 (author’s emphasis).
168 Fourie (note 63 above) para 61.
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Given the importance of marriage in South African society and the Court’s 
acknowledgment of the centrality of marriage, its extension to same-sex per-
manent life partnerships thus became a matter of acknowledging not merely 
the unfairness of the discrimination. It was also an acknowledgment of the 
equal moral citizenship of the members of the South African LGBTI society. 
Furthermore, it was an affirmation by the Constitutional Court that a family 
constituted by a same-sex couple has the same potential and ability to produce 
good citizens as any heterosexual family.169
Unfortunately though, Parliament’s first draft of the Civil Union Bill was 
less accommodating. With the Bill’s civil partnership provisions, it blatantly 
attempted to introduce a second class (moral) citizenship.170 The Bill reserved a 
civil partnership for same-sex life partnerships by defining it as ‘the voluntary 
union of two adult persons of the same sex’,171 while simultaneously making 
it clear that the Marriage Act would be retained exclusively for heterosexual 
marriages.172 This constituted an overt attempt to segregate same-sex couples 
from their heterosexual counterparts on no rational grounds whatsoever. The 
drafters themselves in fact implicitly acknowledged that civil partnerships are 
of a second class or inferior. This was evident from the provisions of s 11 of 
the Bill which allowed for the civil partnership to be called a marriage only 
upon the occasion of solemnization, thus indicating that a special ‘indulgence’ 
would be granted to call the inferior partnership a marriage at least once. 
From this deduction it followed that there was no room for an interpretation 
that civil partnerships are equal to marriage.
The illegitimacy of a civil partnership regime in South Africa (legislated in 
the absence of a choice to marry for same-sex partners) was already acknowl-
edged by the South African Law Reform Commission at the time that the first 
draft of the Civil Union Bill was introduced.173 The civil partnership provisions 
could thus not have been anything other than a deliberate and overt attempt 
to introduce a ‘separate but equal’ marriage regime in South Africa in direct 
contravention of what was said in Fourie.174 These provisions would not and 
could not ensure that same-sex couples would be accorded the equal private 
and public status afforded by marriage.17 Considering the provisions of this Bill 
together with the voting majority’s religious outrage against any form of legal 
recognition for same-sex life partnerships, it became clear that the first draft of 
the Civil Union Bill desperately attempted to negotiate between the prevailing 
public sentiment on the one hand, and the tenor of the Constitutional Court’s 
169 Also see Du Toit (note 119 above).
170 See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate 440 Mass 1201, 802 NE 2d 6 (Mass, 2004) 70, 
where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that an appellation such as civil partner-
ship or civil union without the choice of marriage ‘is a considered choice of language that reflects a 
demonstrable assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to second-class status.’
171 Civil Union Bill (note 136 above) s 1.
172 Ibid s 13(2).
173 SA Law Reform Commission Report on Domestic Partnerships (March 2006) 292 para .3.1, 296 
para .4.11 and 30 para .6.2.
174 Fourie (note 63 above) para 10.
17 Ibid para 81.
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judgment and the interests it vindicated on the other. Viewed from these sides 
respectively, in passing an Act in the form of the first draft of the Civil Union 
Bill Parliament would not be granting marriage but at least it would be giving 
‘full’ legal protection to same-sex couples.
But the underlying ideology that inhered in this particular attempt at negotia-
tion was that the members of the LGBTI society of South Africa could be deemed 
not to be equal citizens because they are morally inferior and thus do not deserve 
access to the special institution of marriage. In light of the effect of the Du Toit 
case, the knock-on effect of this denial of equal moral citizenship to same-sex 
couples would be that children adopted by such a couple would also be denied 
equal moral citizenship because they would belong to a family that the state 
regards as inferior. This would, of course, be constitutionally untenable.176
VI  thInkIng / conclusIon
The fact that the first draft of the South African Civil Union Bill did not become 
legislation testifies to the strong commitment to constitutional democracy 
amongst a critical mass in South Africa. This commitment is in fact so strong 
that it successfully managed to weed out much of the overt totalitarianism that 
was visible for all to see during the legislative process. However, totalitarian-
ism, like homophobia, does not evaporate like the morning dew — even where 
healthy institutions of democracy exist and strong commitment to them is 
undeniable. The ANC probably realised this when, as a matter of instrumental 
politics, it forced the vote of its members in Parliament in order to push the 
revised (and certainly not the ideal)177 version of the Civil Union Bill through 
the legislature in order to meet the Constitutional Court’s deadline.178
Without an ongoing commitment to the rule of law (and its constitutive 
elements discussed here) in the context of the transformation of family law 
in South Africa, the legacy of totalitarianism will not be fully eradicated. It 
is indeed remarkable that South Africa is the only country on the continent 
(and one of few in the world) that now provides for same-sex marriage. What 
is, however, also remarkable is the fact that the Marriage Act 2 of 1961 (and 
it is significant that this is an Act that carries such a distinct date) remains 
on the statute books even though the Constitutional Court declared the Act 
176 See the Constitution s 28(2).
177 The Civil Union Act (note  above) harbours its fair share of problems too — the most important 
of which is the s 6 provision which allows the state’s marriage officers to refuse solemnisation of a 
civil partnership or marriage between partners of the same sex.
178 Fourie (note 63 above), para 162, where the Court ordered that should Parliament not correct the 
unconstitutionality of both the common-law definition of marriage and the provisions reliant ther-
eon in the Marriage Act within 12 months of the Court’s order in Fourie, an automatic reading in 
of the words ‘or spouse’ after the words ‘or husband’ in s 30(1) of the Marriage Act would follow. 
Practically speaking, this meant that Parliament had to conclude the legislative process for the full 
and equal recognition of same-sex life partnerships by 30 November 2006. Also see A Quintal 
‘Civil Union Bill Approved in Historic Vote’ Cape Times (1 November 2006) and Anon ‘South 
Africa Approves Same-Sex Unions’ BBC News (14 November 2006) available at <http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/6147010 stm>.
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and the common-law definition upon which it relied, unconstitutional.179 That 
this represents a compromise (and perhaps even a concession to totalitarian 
impulses) should remain an important item on the agenda (and thus a motivat-
ing force) of all who feel themselves concerned with democracy, the rule of 
law and constitutionalism as a secular ethical discourse.
In conclusion, I would like to return to a dimension of Arendt’s thought to 
which I have only referred to obliquely up to now, although this dimension is 
what ultimately underlies every single aspect of her theory of politics. It is the 
human faculty of reflective judgement, the inverse of which consists in what 
she calls ‘thoughtlessness’. In The Human Condition Arendt expresses the 
belief that thoughtlessness is one of the most outstanding characteristics of our 
time.180 She defines thoughtlessness as ‘the heedless recklessness or hopeless 
confusion or complacent repetition of “truths” that have become trivial and 
empty.’181 From this definition we can discern that thoughtlessness manifests 
in at least three forms: as heedless recklessness, as hopeless confusion or as 
the complacent repetition of ‘truths’.
Before we can fruitfully apply the elements of this definition to the same-
sex marriage ‘debate’ in South Africa it is necessary to say two more things 
about thoughtlessness: one about what its political implications are and second, 
the specific meaning Arendt attributes to it in her report on the trial of Otto 
Adolf Eichmann.182 On the political implications of thoughtlessness Arendt is 
clear. Thoughtlessness is what ultimately enables totalitarianism — it is what 
makes totalitarianism move forward in its crushing, all-encroaching fashion 
as the iron band of terror. Why is it particularly thoughtlessness that enables 
totalitarianism? Because thoughtlessness is that which renders evil banal183 
and thus unrecognisable, perhaps even unstoppable. By removing the ability 
to stop and think, totalitarianism camouflages its evil in such a way that it 
is performed in a banal, normalistic fashion and thus becomes less and less 
permeable, less and less interruptible, less and less recognisable as grotesque 
and abominable.184 The specific meaning Arendt attributes to thoughtlessness 
in Eichmann testifies to its ability to enable totalitarianism. In her report of 
Eichmann’s trial, Arendt describes thoughtlessness more precisely as the 
inability ‘to think from the standpoint of someone else’18 — a profound lack 
of the capacity to imagine.186 Thoughtlessness is what is required to make 
179 See Fourie (note 63 above) para 162.
180 Arendt (note 2 above) .
181 Ibid.
182 H Arendt Eichmann in Jerusalem  A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963, 198).
183 Ibid 22. Arendt describes the banality of evil literally as ‘thought-defying’.
184 Arendt compares totalitarian rule to the structure of an onion: ‘The great advantage of this system 
is that the movement provides for each of its layers, even under conditions of totalitarian rule, the 
fiction of a normal world along with a consciousness of being different from and more radical than 
it.’ Arendt (note  above) 9.
18 Arendt (note 182 above) 49.
186 See LP Thiele ‘Judging Hannah Arendt — A Reply to Zerilli’ (200) 33() Political Theory 706, 
707: ‘imagination … allows us to engage in representative thinking. Herein we gain appreciation 
of the world of others, not so much the actual thoughts and feelings of others but their possible 
thoughts and feelings, given their respective standpoints.’
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someone unaware of what it is that they are doing187 — it is the ‘most reliable 
of all safeguards against the words and the presence of others’.188
During the course of the same-sex marriage debate in South Africa, thought-
lessness (in all its dimensions described above) — ‘something by no means 
identical with stupidity’189 — permeated every stage of the process. As ‘heed-
less recklessness’ thoughtlessness transpired in the many submissions from 
concerned religious groups that opposed same-sex marriage by focusing on the 
‘inability’ of homosexual couples to rear children. This was ‘heedless reckless-
ness’ because, legally and politically speaking, it failed to take account of the 
fact that this argument had already been dismissed by the Constitutional Court 
six years earlier in the Du Toit case. ‘Heedless recklessness’ also transpired in 
the arguments that did not (could not) draw a distinction between the human and 
the non-human by sincerely arguing that affording marriage to same-sex couples 
would leave the door open for the recognition of marriage between a person and 
a corpse or between a human and an animal.190 Needless to say, these arguments 
were also testimony to ‘hopeless confusion’ about the terms of the instant debate 
and the new definition of marriage which remains between humans.
Other instances of ‘hopeless confusion’ as thoughtlessness existed in the 
Deputy Minister of Justice’s assertion that a civil partnership is the same as a 
marriage191 and the African Christian Democratic Party’s (truly thoughtless) 
call for a constitutional amendment to protect heterosexual marriage.192 It was 
also evident in the arguments that homosexuality is un-African. The latter 
argument was obviously hopelessly confused about the extent of colonial 
imposition and its concomitant introduction of Western concepts (such as 
homosexuality) into the subaltern psyche. The smallest extension of (reflec-
tive) thought would have not only realised this but would also have been 
conscious of the many same-sex practices that exist in Africa today.
But the most vivid manifestation of thoughtlessness was ‘the complacent 
repetition of “truths” that have become trivial and empty’. These ranged from 
the argument that marriage is ‘inherently’ a union between a man and a woman 
to the argument that marriage was a religious concept instituted by God, from 
the argument that homosexuality is ‘unnatural’ to the argument that same-sex 
marriages are inherently more prone to domestic violence and dissolution; 
from the argument that the Bible condemns same-sex marriage to the argu-
187 Arendt (note 182 above) 287. This formulation is the negative of Arendt’s appeal at the beginning 
of the The Human Condition, namely to ‘think what we are doing’. See Arendt (note 2 above) .
188 Arendt (note 182 above) 49.
189 Ibid 288.
190 This argument was voiced in the public participation hearings by executive members of the Christian 
Action Network.
191 Home Affairs Portfolio Committee Minutes of a Meeting held on 6 September 2006: Civil Union 
Bill, Film and Publications Amendment Bill and Immigration Amendment Bill: Briefing By 
Minister available at <http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=8187>.
192 See J Evans ‘Government to Respect Gay Marriage Ruling’ Mail and Guardian Online (1 December 
200) available at
 <http://www mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=28227&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news_
_national>.
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ment that homosexuality is a psychological disorder.193 All these ‘truths’ have 
been exposed as fallacies, became ‘trivial and empty’ many years ago and yet 
they were arrogantly put on exhibit (and hosted) in/on stages of processes that 
smacked unpleasantly of vitriol and naked, undisguised hatred.
As this article has shown, these instances of thoughtlessness are always 
closely connected with a totalitarian impulse which denies the most basic ele-
ments of a democratic politics and a constitutional order founded on the rule 
of law. However, the opposition to same-sex marriage could not avoid the fact 
that the South African Constitution does not and will not enable totalitarianism, 
because it not only ‘requires that the law and public institutions acknowledge 
the variability of human beings and affirm the equal respect and concern that 
should be shown to all as they are’194 — it also demands of the South African 
people, at every turn, to stop and think. The fact that this demand is not always 
heard or obeyed does not take anything away from the fact that thinking (at the 
very least) from the standpoint of someone else remains the criterion by which 
conduct and process in South Africa will continue to be judged.
As a result of sheer intolerance (hatred (of democracy)), Arendt’s vision 
of civic friendship has not yet come to fruition in South Africa. All over the 
country the space of appearance is threatened, the sharing of a common world 
continuously at risk. But as Arendt also contended, perhaps too optimistically, 
totalitarianism bears the germs of its own destruction in that it represents an 
anti-social (and thus unsustainable) situation destructive of the very thing that 
makes people human — living together.19 And as every end undeniably and 
necessarily also contains a new beginning, the new beginning to which the 
Civil Union Act bears witness also testifies to the supreme capacity of the 
human — the ability to begin something new.196 Rancière argues that ‘the 
rights of man and of the citizen are the rights of those who make them a real-
ity. They were won through democratic action and are only ever guaranteed 
through such action.’197 Thus, while this joyous new beginning calls for much 
celebration, we need to remain at the wake of this time, for it must be thought 
of as a necessarily precarious time — a time that undeniably leaves us with 
what is perhaps the question of our age and thus a question that demands 
unbreachable responsibility: ‘When will we be ready for an experience of free-
dom and equality that is capable of respectfully experiencing that friendship, 
which would at last be just, just beyond the law, and measured up against its 
measurelessness? O my democratic friends …’198
193 See note 80 above. These arguments were contained in submission after submission, consumed with 
/ by religious fundamentalist fantasy.
194 National Coalition (note 46 above) para 134.
19 Arendt (note 40 above) 478.
196 Ibid 473, 478-479. Rancière (note 7 above) 96.
197 Rancière (note 7 above) 74.
198 Derrida (note 126 above) 306.
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